Theme Panel Mini-Conference
Criminal Politics in Violent Democracies
Saturday, September 7, 8:00am – 9:30am
Co-sponsored by Division 21: Conflict Processes
Full Paper Panel
Participants:
(Chair) Lucia Tiscornia, University College Dublin
(Discussant) Enrique Desmond Arias, Baruch College, CUNY
Session Description:
In contrast to previous eras characterized by predominantly rural insurgencies, contemporary security threats in numerous “violent democracies” are primarily driven by organized criminal groups operating in both rural and urban areas. These entities, involved in both criminal violence and governance, pose a significant challenge to the stability of these democracies. They engage in fierce territorial battles, not only among themselves but also against state forces, vying for control and dominance at the local level. This dynamic interaction involves complex relationships with state representatives, where collusion can either contribute to stability or exacerbate violence. The impact of these organizations extends beyond mere criminality, as they intricately engage, violently and non-violently, with the communities in which they operate. Consequently, they emerge as pivotal forces that actively shape the political and social landscapes of crime-affected areas.
While political scientists have increasingly delved into the “politics of crime,” with a specific focus on governmental policies to control criminal activities, crucial aspects remain unexplored within this burgeoning literature. Key questions persist, such as the motivations behind some drug-trafficking organizations opting for violence and the reactions of communities to this violence. Why do some groups use violence and others show restraint? Which social responses are triggered, by which forces, and to which effects? Finally, exploring public support for alternative governmental responses is also paramount: what contributes to greater backing for specific approaches? Is there room for moving away from militarization and iron-fist enforcement? Addressing these gaps is essential to comprehensively understand the intricate dynamics surrounding organized crime, politics, and society.
This panel brings together a cohort of early and mid-career scholars. The four papers showcased delve into pressing questions, providing fresh insights that contribute to bridging current research gaps. Although the papers focus on a selection of countries profoundly impacted by criminal violence Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador- the importance of these issues has implications for various urban areas across the developing world and beyond.
In the first paper, Laura Blume (University of Nevada, Reno) presents an innovative theory examining the strategic decisions made by drug-trafficking organizations and their consequent impact on their use of violence against specific sectors of the population, encompassing politicians, activists, media workers, and judicial officials.
Rebecca Bell-Martin (Tecnológico de Monterrey, Mexico) and Abby Cordova (University of Notre Dame) redirect the focus to how social actors respond to such violence. Delving into noteworthy cases within Mexico’s “war on drugs,” Bell-Martin explores the dynamics of empathy for victims of criminal violence, investigating how this emotion serves as a catalyst for political mobilization, and how political leaders and human rights advocates strategically use empathy to influence societal reactions to violence.
Cordova, focusing on El Salvador, further explores social responses to violence, investigating whether public attitudes towards victims are sensitive to the characteristics of the victim, of the perpetrator, and of the violence itself, with a particular focus on gender dynamics.
Concluding the panel, Davide Morisi (University of Southern Denmark) and Juan Masullo (Leiden University) shift the focus toward public support for alternative approaches to addressing criminal violence. Focusing on Brazil, they show that public support for approaches that move away from unconditional crackdowns on all criminal groups is stronger than what scholars and policymakers commonly assume. They delineate the primary correlates of support and explore policy goals and frames capable of mobilizing public endorsem*nt for alternative responses to criminal violence.
The limitations in this expanding literature largely stem from insufficient data on the subject and the challenges associated with obtaining reliable information. In response to these obstacles, the researchers in this panel have adopted diverse data sources and innovative techniques for data collection and analysis, such as ethnographies, qualitative content analysis, in-depth interviewing, and survey experimental methods. Consequently, this panel embodies the essential interdisciplinary and methodological pluralism that has characterized this intricate and evolving research sub-field.
Desmond Arias (CUNY) and Lucia Tiscornia (University College Dublin), distinguished scholars who have not only pioneered but also expanded the frontiers of this research agenda, will serve as the Chair and Discussant for the panel.
Papers:
The Art of Trafficking: How Politics Influences Narco-Violence
Laura Blume, University of Nevada Reno
Why does drug trafficking sometimes result in high levels of violence, but other times occur relatively peacefully? Drawing on over two years of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2017 and 2020 in key trafficking and transshipment hubs along the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras, this project advances an original theory of the strategic choices that traffickers make and the implications of these strategies in terms of trafficking-related violence. The theory works across scales of governance to show how international policies, national-level institutional contexts, and local-level factors can either incentivize or restrain narcotraffickers in Central America from engaging in lethal violence. In this paper, I not only show how levels of trafficking violence vary, but also that geographic patterns, nature of targets, and visibility of violence vary depending on traffickers’ strategies. To do so, I draw on my ethnographic fieldwork, an original dataset on massacres between 2012-2022, and data from the Violence Against Public Figures (VAPF) project which tracks assassinations of public figures (politicians, activists, media workers, and judicial officials) in Central America from 2008 – 2022. Including VAPF data, as well as a novel dataset on massacres, enables me to paint a far more nuanced picture of violence in the areas where I did fieldwork. For instance, while Nicaragua has the lowest national homicide rate, both autonomous regions on the Caribbean coast where I focused my work have homicide rates above the national average (although still below rates of violence in my other field sites). Most of the violence in Nicaragua is not related to trafficking, but rather is violence perpetuated against opposition activists and Indigenous land defenders. The Costa Rican province of Limon has far lower levels of violence against public figures, despite having a higher homicide rate. In fact, given traffickers’ reliance on evasion strategies, very few public figures are killed in Limon because such acts tend to result in increases in checkpoints and policing in the province — something that traffickers seek to elude. While Honduras overall has the highest level of violence towards activists, journalists, politicians, and judicial officials, Gracias a Dios reflects lower levels of this kind of violence. Moreover, two of the politicians from Gracias a Dios who have been killed in the last ten years were murdered outside the department, further illustrating a broader geographic pattern. While in the field, I learned that most violence impacting this Honduran department and committed against its inhabitants occurs outside the department – meaning it is not reflected in subnational homicide data. In addition to illustrating important differences in violence that result from traffickers’ distinct strategies, this chapter challenges us to move beyond homicide rates in understanding patterns of violence in Latin America.
States, Human Rights and Empathy-Based Political Mobilization during Violence
Rebecca Bell-Martin, Tecnologico de Monterrey
In violent contexts, research suggests that empathy for victims of violence motivates pro-social behaviors like civic engagement, political participation, and helping migrants and refugees. This suggests empathy may be an important source of political mobilization. How do political leaders respond? In what ways do they leverage empathy to influence citizen political engagement around violence? I investigate this question through one important case of contemporary conflict, Mexico’s “drug war,” and the political strategies of two key actors: the state and human rights advocates. I argue that human rights advocates should attempt to persuade the public by appealing to its sense of empathy. This is so because human rights advocates aim to motivate public engagement around victims’ rights and justice processes and thus benefit from marshaling citizens’ empathy for drug war victims. States, on the other hand, should discourage citizens’ empathy for victims to minimize public complaints and foster support for state security policies. I test this theory through qualitative content analysis of states’ and human rights advocates’ public statements surrounding four cases of organized crime violence in Mexico: (i) the Sabino Gordo massacre; (ii) the Café Iguana shooting; (iii) the disappearance of 43 students in Ayotzinapa; and (iv) the Tlatlaya massacre. I pair this with interviews with state officials, human rights representatives, and media deputies. Across the cases, I find that the state consistently uses language discouraging empathy with victims. Human rights advocates, meanwhile, use empathy-generating language only intermittently. I then interrogate why advocates leverage empathy in some – but not all – political campaigns. This research advances knowledge about the conditions for broad-based citizen action against violence and about the emotional foundations of political mobilization. While we know much about how political leaders manipulate emotions like anger, fear, and resentment to mobilize followers, the mobilizing power of empathy remains underexplored.
Citizen Responses to Gender and Non-gender Based Violence in Criminal Wars
Abby B. Cordova, University of Notre Dame
Across the world, the spread of organized crime and governments’ militarization of public security have resulted in numerous accounts of gendered and non-gendered crimes committed by both criminal and state armed actors, particularly in territories known for organized criminal groups’ control. Citizens’ support for all victims of violence, and thus willingness to stand for victims’ human rights, is quintessential for promoting democratic societies sustained in the rule of law. However, previous research shows that citizens are not favorable to all victims but decide their level of support selectively depending on perceptions of victims’ innocence and personal experiences with crime. This study builds on the findings of previous scholarship by examining experimentally the extent to which attitudes toward victims in the context of criminal wars depend on four largely understudied characteristics: victims’ gender (men or women), perpetrators’ identity (criminal or state armed actors), the type of violence suffered (gender or non-gender based), and salience of organized criminal groups’ territorial control. The findings contribute to research examining the attitudinal and behavioral responses to violence by studying the topic through the lens of gender in a multi-violence context where both criminal and state violence are salient (El Salvador). The findings show that, although citizens are more likely to condemn sexual violence against women than other types of crimes, public opinion is more tolerant of all violent acts (gender-based or not) when committed by state armed actors than members of organized criminal organizations, particularly when aggressions occur in places marked by territorial control.
Destroying Criminals or Enacting Preferred Behaviors?
Juan Masullo, Leiden University; Davide Morisi, University of Southern Denmark
Recent research shows that when state repression is conditional on how criminals behave, it is likely to be more effective in curbing criminal violence. Policymakers and scholars alike argue that governments do not adopt a selective repression approach more often because it is likely unpopular, as the public might see it as “soft on crime.” To test this proposition, we study public attitudes in two Brazilian cities profoundly affected by criminal violence, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, leveraging cross-city variation in how drug syndicates participate in the drug trade and engage in violence. We draw on survey experiments to (a) descriptively map support for selective repression and (b) experimentally identify potential factors that could drive this support. We find that support for selective repression is higher than policymakers and scholars expect: one-third of our respondents are willing to back the implementation of such an approach in the cities. Support is higher in São Paulo than in Rio de Janeiro, suggesting that fiercer competition between drug syndicates and higher levels of violence do not drive support. When conditional repression is framed as a means of reducing violence, support for conditional repression decreases. However, the public cares more about reducing some forms of violence than about others. In both cities, support for conditional repression is higher when aimed at reducing forms of violence that directly affect the population.
Democracy, Dictatorship, and Democratic Backsliding in Central America
Saturday, September 7, 10:00am – 11:30am
Co-sponsored by Division 12: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries
Full Paper Panel
Participants:
(Chair) Patricio D. Navia, Universidad Diego Portales
(Discussant) Christine J. Wade, Washington College
(Discussant) Deborah Yashar, Princeton University
Session Description:
In the wake of military dictatorships and civil wars, the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua transitioned to democracy. For a brief moment, it seemed like democracy would flourish: rivals, including those on opposite sides of armed conflict, embraced elections as the only legitimate way to govern, and competitive elections ushered in an unprecedented era of peaceful power alternations. But despite these noteworthy advances, beginning in the early 2000s, democracy stagnated, and autocracy made a comeback. Electoral democracies have reversed to a full dictatorship (Nicaragua), are in the process of being replaced by competitive authoritarianism (El Salvador) or remain on a tightrope after recent elections (Honduras and Guatemala). This panel, which examines the region through case studies and cross-country comparisons, seeks to answer the following questions: Why has democracy proven fragile and authoritarianism resilient in Central America? What tactics and strategies have incumbents used in their varying power-grabbing efforts? How have opposition blocs responded to those threats, and what are the prospects for future democratization in the region? And what lessons can we draw from Central America’s troubled record with democracy and authoritarianism?
Papers:
Anti-corruption Crusades and Democratic Erosion: Evidence from Guatemala
Rachel A. Schwartz, University of Oklahoma
The quality of democracy and the extent of political corruption are often seen as intertwined. Democratic institutions are assumed to be a bulwark against corruption because they provide mechanisms to hold corrupt officials accountable and enhance political competition in ways that disincentivize corrupt behavior. Corruption also has deleterious effects on democracy. It foments citizen mistrust and dissatisfaction with the democratic system and may even lay the groundwork for authoritarian actors to seize on widespread disillusionment and take power. Under these logics, efforts to combat corruption and strengthen rule of law institutions should have salutary effects on democracy. Yet, this is not always the case. Analyzing the Guatemalan context over the last fifteen years, this paper examines when and why anti-corruption crusades give way to democratic backsliding. In so doing, I unpack two mechanisms through which anti-corruption and rule of law strengthening efforts can trigger authoritarian regressions: 1) by stoking backlash amongst a broad swath of elite actors, who resort to anti-democratic maneuvers to preserve impunity, and 2) by developing new institutional tools that can be appropriated by anti-democratic actors to further autocratic legalism once in power. The Guatemalan case offers a cautionary tale for international and domestic anti-corruption efforts, illustrating the limits and unintended consequences of strengthening institutions within fragile and fraught democratic systems.
Authoritarian Personalism, Parties, and Democratic Erosion in Central America
Kai Massey Thaler, University of California, Santa Barbara
When authoritarian-minded personalist politicians seek power in electoral democracies, how do they use political parties? Some personalists seek to gain control of an existing political party to turn it towards their interests, acting as caudillos who push out opponents and centralize the party around themselves. Other personalists develop their own party and use populist, anti-establishment appeals to break through the control of established political elites and take power. Once in office, caudillos, and populists both seek to erode democratic institutions and norms to aggrandize executive power, but is the way they use parties different? We might expect variation, since caudillos may have preexisting party elites to manage and could face legislative challenges, while populists in personalist parties have exercised greater control over the party and its membership, and so may be less susceptible to internal tensions. This paper compares the cases of the caudillo Daniel Ortega and his FSLN party in Nicaragua and populist Nayib Bukele and his Nuevas Ideas party in El Salvador to develop a theory of how personalist political leaders’ use parties in their quest to erode democracy and consolidate authoritarian control. Ortega was a former revolutionary leader in the FSLN who gradually gained influence during the group’s collective rule in the 1980s, becoming first among equals among FSLN commanders. After the FSLN lost power, Ortega set about centralizing the FSLN around himself and later his family. Bukele, by contrast, was initially a politician in the ex-rebel FMLN party, but abandoned it after pushback from party elites, starting Nuevas Ideas and sweeping to power. Bukele has emulated some of Ortega’s democracy-eroding practices, but also forged his own path. Comparing these two cases will illustrate how authoritarian personalists in similar post-conflict Central American settings used parties pursuing unfettered power, and I also assess whether lessons from these cases may generalize elsewhere in Latin America or beyond.
Human Rights Violations and Citizen Support for Accountability in Guatemala
Joséphine Lechartre, University of Notre Dame; Regina A. Bateson, University of Colorado, Boulder
Establishing a common historical ground about past human rights violations is often presented as one of the main benefits of transitional justice. It is often assumed that increasing citizens’ awareness of past violence will consolidate the post-conflict political transition by promoting shared values of non-repetition, respect for human rights and accountability. However, this assumption has yet to be empirically tested. Using several experiments embedded in two surveys with a total of 1,100 respondents in Guatemala, this article analyzes whether knowledge of human rights violations committed by the military during the country’s armed conflict affects Guatemalan’s judgement towards the militarization of public safety, accountability, and preferences for systems of government. Contrary to the assumptions of the transitional justice literature, we find that increasing awareness of past human rights violations committed by the military does little to promote citizens’ support for accountability. Similarly to other Latin American citizens, Guatemalan citizens tend to display a preference for punitive and militarized security policies and place the fight against corruption at the center of their policy preferences.
Disrupting Institutionalized Party Systems: Evidence from Central America
Lucas Perelló, Marist College
Democratic erosion in Central America has often coincided with party system disruptions. This article compares Honduras and El Salvador, which scholars recently labeled as having some of the most institutionalized party systems in Latin America and the Caribbean, to deepen our knowledge of realignment and dealignment in the region. In Honduras, the 2009 coup fueled the rise of new parties, like the left-wing Freedom and Refoundation (LIBRE) party, which gradually forced a realignment. In El Salvador, the rise of Nayib Bukele and his New Ideas (NI) party led to the breakdown of traditional parties and the party system’s borderline collapse. Using the AmericasBarometer survey waves, this article examines the individual-level determinants of support for challenger and traditional parties, and possibly, the emergence of new political divisions, as a function of (1) socio-demographic features, (2) ideology, (3) attitudes toward democracy, (4) and the organizational features of parties.
Criminal Electioneering & Democracy in Central America: Evidence from Guatemala
Manuel Meléndez-Sánchez, Harvard University
In this paper, I examine one understudied mechanism through which criminal organizations like street gangs and drug cartels have undermined the integrity and legitimacy of democratic institutions in Central America: their deliberate efforts to influence elections outcomes, or what I call “criminal electioneering.” I develop a conceptual and theoretical framework to help explain (1) when criminal groups choose to engage in criminal electioneering; (2) why, when they do, their tactics vary along two key dimensions (the degree to which they target voters vs politicians and the extent to which they overt violence); and (3) how different criminal electioneering tactics shape voter attitudes toward democracy and toward hardline anti-crime policies. I argue that two key variables drive criminal electioneering outcomes at the subnational level: the degree of criminal competition and politicians’ access to local party resources. I test my hypotheses through a survey of voters in Guatemala carried out in the aftermath of the country’s 2023 general election. I discuss the implications of my findings for emerging debates about the relationship between criminal violence and democratic legitimacy and survival in Central America and beyond.
Migration as Part of the Authoritarian Toolkit
Saturday, September 7, 12:00pm – 1:30pm
Co-sponsored by Division 52: Migration & Citizenship
Full Paper Panel
Participants:
(Chair) Michael Jones-Correa, University of Pennsylvania
(Discussant) Katrina Burgess, Tufts University
(Discussant) Michael Jones-Correa, University of Pennsylvania
Session Description:
The political behavior of immigrants has long been a major theme within the literature on migration and citizenship, but rarely has the impact of exit from authoritarianism been explicitly considered as a key IV governing this behavior. To what extent does authoritarianism motivate citizens to emigrate, and in what ways does exposure to authoritarianism impact immigrants’ subsequent political behavior in their new countries? And given the widespread awareness that immigrant populations may push for regime change from abroad, in what ways do authoritarian regimes react to or even exploit the political activity of their populations abroad to maintain power?
This panel aims to address these questions by focusing on the nexus between authoritarianism and migration. Allen and Wellman examine the expansion of voting rights to citizens living abroad through the lens of Schedler’s “menu of manipulation.” Bolotnyy, Komisarchik, and Libgober analyze notable relationships between past exposure to authoritarianism and voting behavior after emigration among Jewish refugees. Peters and Miller show that autocrats employ a variety of strategies to prevent citizens living abroad from spreading democracy back to their home countries. Morse examines the ways in which Turkish immigrants translate and map their ideologies onto more democratic political landscapes. Finally, using Zimbabwe as a case study, Dendere identifies a “migration premium” benefitting authoritarian regimes by allowing them to manipulate political outcomes more easily.
Together, these papers address the topic of migration and authoritarianism using diverse cases and embrace an inter-subfield and interdisciplinary approach to research on migration. Key themes of the panel include migration, political behavior, transnationalism, autocratic legalism, and political socialization.
Papers:
Diaspora Voting: A New Item on the “Menu of Manipulation”?
Nathan Allen, St. Francis Xavier University; Elizabeth Iams Wellman, University of Memphis
Since 1990, over 100 countries have extended voting rights to their citizens abroad. Although diaspora voting can be argued as a mechanism for increased inclusion, the potential for governments to employ diaspora voting as a form of electoral manipulation is both theoretically feasible and empirically evident. Drawing on Schedler’s classic “Menu of Manipulation” (2003), this article explores how choices in the organization and implementation of voting abroad can serve as new strategies for violating democratic norms. We identify numerous points of potential manipulation of diaspora voting throughout the election process that correspond with Schedler’s “chain of democratic choice” at both individual and institutional levels. We also look beyond country-of-origin policies to consider how country of residence can also manipulate both the range of choices offered to diaspora voters as well as the formation of preferences. Cases of diaspora voting manipulation, including elections in Italy, Ghana, and Russia, illuminate the diversity of emerging tactics. Our study demonstrates how transnational voting is now a new item on the menu of election fraud.
Backlash against Repression: Evidence from Refugees Fleeing the Soviet Bloc
Valentin Bolotnyy, Hoover Institution; Mayya Komisarchik, University of Rochester; Brian Daniel Libgober, Northwestern University
Using administrative data on Jewish refugees fleeing the Former Soviet Bloc for the United States between 1955 and 2000, along with survey data on Israeli citizens born in the Former Soviet Bloc, we demonstrate persistent downstream political consequences of living as a targeted minority under a repressive, communist regime. Using a within-family research design, we show that individuals who spent longer periods living under a Soviet Bloc government are more likely to engage in backlash against the regime that oppressed them by (1) being more likely to vote in their new democratic countries and (2) affiliating with right-wing political parties most unlike ruling regimes in their origin countries.
Autocrats’ Strategies to Preventing the Spread of Democracy by Migrants
Margaret E. Peters, University of California, Los Angeles; Michael Miller, George Washington University
An increasingly large literature demonstrates that migrants from autocracies to democracies spread democratic norms back to their home country and help foment democratic change there. This ability to spread democracy is not unknown to autocrats. Given the possibility for the spread of democracy, how do autocrats strategically respond to this possibility? In this book chapter, we use several case studies, including China, Taiwan, Algeria, and Morocco, to illustrate that (1) autocrats understand the ability of migrants to spread democracy and (2) the strategies that states use to counteract migrants’ spread of democracy. We show that states use many strategies: preventing incorporation in the host state, censorship, intimidation, and incarceration. Together, this chapter demonstrates how autocratic states try to gain the benefits of migration without losing their control over society.
Just Another Erdogan: How Migrants Map Political Beliefs onto New Contexts
Irene Morse, University of Michigan
An emerging body of literature is beginning to consider how immigrants from an authoritarian home country adapt and change upon moving to more a democratic context. Building on the literature on political socialization, I argue that immigrants are “re-socialized” within their new political environment. As part of this process, immigrants use existing prior political beliefs and ideologies – often based heavily on their foundational political experiences in their authoritarian home country – as heuristics for understanding their new political context. By conducting and analyzing in-depth interviews with Turks living the United States, I theorize the process by which immigrants map these prior political beliefs and ideologies onto their new context and the resulting impact on their political behavior, a key concern for both the home country and the hosting country.
Migration Premium for Authoritarian Survival
Chipo Dendere, Wellesley College
This paper discusses the strategies adopted by authoritarian regimes to silence the voices of citizens living abroad. Drawing from interviews with Zimbabweans living abroad and a study of their voting patterns I show that authoritarian regimes benefit from a migration premium. When would-be opposition voters leave the country, the ruling party has room to manipulate political outcomes in their favor.
Roundtable on Democratic Retrenchment in Asia
Saturday, September 7, 2:00pm – 3:30pm
Roundtable
Participants:
(Chair) Dan Slater, University of Michigan
(Presenter) Ashutosh Varshney, Brown University
(Presenter) Sana Jaffrey, Australian National University
(Presenter) Ali Riaz, Illinois State University
(Presenter) Sol Iglesias, University of the Philippines
Session Description:
This roundtable responds to the theme of this year’s annual conference by examining the varieties of democratic retrenchment in Asia. Presenters will discuss outcomes of recent elections, held between 2022 and 2024, across Asia’s most populous democracies to debate the tension between popular representation and institutional accountability.
The roundtable will take a long-term view of democracy in the region to explore the distinct ways in which populist leaders in Asia have used their public mandate to confront or co-opt opposition parties, denying voters legislative alternatives and in some cases eliminating electoral choice altogether. Presenters will also discuss ways in which these leaders and their affiliates have brought key democratic institutions, including courts, media, anti-corruption agencies and electoral bodies into compliance with their larger political and ideological projects. They will further cover some common legal and extra-legal measures that have been used to consolidate popular support and minimize resistance from civil society groups.
By bringing scholars of South Asia and Southeast Asia in conversation, this roundtable will also discuss the role of voters in supporting and opposing the process of democratic retrenchment across Asia. How does the promise of economic prosperity bolster support for exclusionary ideologies in India and Indonesia? Why are the voters in Philippines and Indonesia underwriting a triumphant return of authoritarian-era pariahs through genuinely competitive elections? Is the fear of conservative Islam fueling popular support for civil society curbs in Indonesia and Bangladesh?
Presenters will further compare the common strategies that pro-democracy forces are using to fight democratic retrenchment and the avenues of redress that are still open to them. These include sub-national governance, alternative media outlets and youth groups.
Finally, the session will conclude by discussing the prospects for democratic renovation and reimagination in the region and how Asia’s experience can inform the broader field of knowledge about democratic politics.
The roundtable will run for 90 min. The chair will deliver opening remarks to identify big questions in the field and points of comparison (10 min). Each of the four presenters will speak on their country of expertise (40 min), followed by a roundtable debate and questions from the audience (40 min).
Democracy in Francophone Africa: Enduring Challenges and Paths Forward
Saturday, September 7, 4:00pm – 5:30pm
Full Paper Panel
Participants:
(Chair) Aili Mari Tripp, University of Wisconsin, Madison
(Discussant) Scott Straus, University of California, Berkeley
Session Description:
In the last four years, there have been 8 coups in Francophone Africa including two different coups in both Mali and Burkina Faso, which raise many questions about future governance trajectories for this understudied region. This panel explores governance, political economy, and citizen behavior across a range of countries in Francophone Africa. It touches on challenges facing countries in the region including informal economies and underemployment as well as accountable governance, but also pockets of democratic resilience. In doing so it highlights the tremendous variation in regime trajectories and citizens’ relationship to those regimes to highlight the distinct challenges and paths forward in a few different countries.
Elischer’s paper provides a useful overview of the recent coup wave in West Africa drawing on descriptive statistics, process tracing, and CSQA to compare causes and consequences of military interventions in Mali, Guinea, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Gabon. He shows that while all ruling juntas would like to put a presidential candidate in office, those that are most able to do so are the junta’s that share grievances with the broader military.
Diebire and Bleck offer in-depth analysis of country cases with a specific focus on citizens’ attitudes and behavior. Diebire explores the role of ethnicity in contemporary Burkina Faso and argues that citizens who prioritize ethnic identity over national identity are more skeptical about democratic governance and more willing to embrace authoritarian rule. Bleck explores the contradictions within Mali’s multi-party era by drawing on focus group data with members of more than 60 tea-drinking social clubs – mostly young, urban men. She highlights a perceived distance between citizens and elected officials, but the robust deliberative culture within Mali society as well as strong connections between citizens and non-elected forms of authority – such as religious leaders and traditional elites. Both papers offer insight into popular support for ruling juntas in countries which have boasted strong, pro-democracy popular movements in the past.
Finally, Gottlieb and Bhandari explore citizen preferences in a Francophone country that has not been touched by the coup wave but has been rocked by waves of protest: Senegal. They compare owners of formal and informal firms to see the conditions under which business owners might vote for programmatic policies instead of clientelist appeals. They use an information experiment in the lead up to Senegal’s 2022 elections and show that formal firms and informal firms that think they might formalize are more likely to support programmatic candidates than informal firms. The paper offers important lessons about voters in Senegal, but also those throughout this region – dominated by the informal economy.
Papers:
Toward Praetorian-Led Electoral Authoritarianism? Coups in Francophone Africa
Sebastian Elischer, University of Florida
The wave of military coups between 2020 and 2023 in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Chad, and Gabon has raised longstanding questions about the role of the military in fragile democratization processes. Drawing on descriptive statistical data, multimethod research techniques including csqca and process-tracing, and several rounds of field research in all six countries, the paper compares the causes and the subsequent political consequences of these military interventions. It is interested in the ability of the six juntas to influence the post-coup elections in favor of their preferred presidential candidate. The capacity of the juntas to do so varies significantly across the six countries. The extent to which the motives of the junta overlap with the grievances of the military-at large is the most decisive factor in accounting for this variation. Other variables such as the relationship between the junta and civilian domestic elites or the extent to which Western countries enjoy economic as well as diplomatic leverage matter comparatively little.
Tribe or Nation: Ethnicity’s Grip on African Political Ideology
Samira Diebire, University of Essex
Amid the backdrop of recent coups and socio-political upheavals in Africa, this paper investigates the role of ethnic identity in shaping attitudes towards democracy, using Burkina Faso as a case study. I find a clear trend: relative to those who identify with their nationality over their ethnicity, individuals who identify with their ethnic group over their national identity tend to harbour reservations towards democratic governance, while simultaneously showing a preference for military or one-man rule. These findings highlight potential challenges for democratic resilience in the region. As West Africa grapples with political transitions and the Sahelian crisis, this study offers crucial insights into the ethnic dimension of democratic attitudes, carrying implications for policymakers, scholars, and state-building initiatives in fragile contexts.
Desires for Accountability and Obstacles to Democracy in Mali
Jaimie Bleck, University of Notre Dame
This chapter draws explores the contradictions within Mali’s multi-party era by drawing on focus group data with more than 300 members of 66 tea-drinking social clubs in Bamako and Mopti/Sevare – mostly young, urban men. The data, collected in 2015, highlight a perceived distance between citizens and elected officials, but also robust deliberative culture within Mali society as well as strong connections between citizens and non-elected forms of authority – such as religious leaders and traditional elites. It explores the ways that popular this disjuncture fuels popular frustration with multi-party elections and desire for deep-seated reforms – foreshadowing popular support for Mali’s ruling junta. It concludes by highlighting young people’s ideas about an ideal political leader – stressing the importance of someone who is accountable to and responsible for the population’s concerns.
Private-Sector Support for Programmatic Candidates: Evidence from Senegal
Abhit Bhandari, Vanderbilt University; Jessica Gottlieb, University of Houston
Informal firm owners in developing countries are thought to value clientelistic policies. Informal firms vie for targeted goods in competition over limited state resources, and, due to the electoral value of private-sector support, politicians offer clientelistic policies such as forbearance. In some countries where the informal sector has historically dominated economies, however, policymakers have touted business formalization as a method to break away from such clientelistic cycles. In this paper, we examine the conditions under which business owners may vote for programmatic candidates that campaign on impersonal, universalistic policies instead of particularistic ones. We argue that firm formality plays a critical role in moderating support for clientelistic candidates. Formal firms, facing complex local political pressures, are more likely to support programmatic candidates. Informal firms who believe they might formalize similarly break away from the cycle of clientelism. Using evidence from an information experiment conducted with firm owners in the formal and informal sectors ahead of Senegal’s local elections in 2022, we demonstrate the conditions under which workers prefer programmatic candidates. The results have implications for breaking links between the private sector and clientelism in developing economies, and simultaneously reducing economic inequality and market segmentation.
Aid and the Unraveling of Civil Society in Guinea and Sierra Leone
Michelle Reddy, University of California Berkeley
The exhilarating third wave of democratization in the 1990s made it seem like democracy had triumphed the world over. However, since 2006, the high tide of democracy was slowly beginning to erode, and at a much faster pace in recent years. Democratic backsliding is global, even in West Africa, the region that made the most democratic gains in the 1990s and 2000s. “Coup culture” and unconstitutional changes to power have once again become pervasive (see, for example, Council on Foreign Relations 2021; Sampson 2012; Mustapha 2012), despite significant international investment in civil society and the active role civil society played in peacebuilding and democratic transition in many West African countries. While democratic consolidation cannot be reduced to a single factor (Diamond 2022), a strong civil society was viewed as a way to institutionalize democratic norms and serve as a buffer against backsliding. A “free and lively civil society”, effective electoral and representative institutions, rule of law, a functional state bureaucracy, and a market economy were viewed as the pillars of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996). Consequently, following a series of civil wars from 1989-2003, international organizations encouraged the formation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in West Africa to rebuild civil society as part of the peacebuilding process, to promote democracy, and to counterbalance the state. Drawing on the Tocquevillian idea that voluntary associations without political objectives form the cornerstone of democratic civil life (de Tocqueville, 1835/1994), Putnam et al (1993) argued that associations produced horizontal networks of trust generating civic engagement. Subsequently, Putnam’s neo-Tocquevillian vision of civil society influenced the democratization wave of the 1990s. International organizations imagined a West African civil society comprised of formal organizations (WACSI, 2015) and separate from politics (LeVan, 2011), as central to democratization and development. Participatory approaches became a cornerstone of international development and peacebuilding (Sampson, 2012) and inclusion of civil society was viewed as the way to address emerging global threats (United Nations, 2004). While Western technical assistance reportedly was more prevalent in successful transitions and more limited, or absent, in failed transitions (Stoner et al 2013), external aid to civil society in West Africa has increasingly been questioned from a theoretical perspective as well as from a policy perspective. However, could (and should) civil society in West Africa be apolitical? While various scholars have debated the apolitical vision of civil society in West Africa (see, for example, LeVan 2011), in this book, I examine two main variables: politicization and professionalization, and discuss to what extent the professionalization and politicization of civil society influence a community’s capacity to collectively respond to crisis, drawing broader implications for democratic consolidation in West Africa. In addition, to what extent do donor preferences, especially with regards to professionalism, or technical capacity, shape civil society, and what does this mean for democracy? This book aims to consolidate these debates within a context where there is increasing skepticism among West Africans as to whether democracy has achieved its promises. Challenges to Western-funded civil society in Africa, for example, the lack of local finance and state-civil society relations, have not been examined systematically over time and across countries. Overall, this book traces the emergence and evolution of formal civil society organizations from democratic transition in Guinea and Sierra Leone, to public health crises (Ebola and COVID-19), and challenges to democracy at present. I examine the presence and density of non-profits as indicative of civic capacity across four field sites (capital cities and large towns in the interior) in Sierra Leone and Guinea, two countries with a prior experience of conflict and similar levels of human development, sharing a long border, with different institutional legacies. I argue that it is not just the number of associations, or having diverse nonprofits, that leads to resilience – in addition, the quality of deliberation and participation within organization and between organizations, and the diversity of organizations within civil society, matter for resilience. Considerations of the mechanisms fostering civic engagement, such as deliberation over issues, and community meeting attendance, are important in creating the type of civil society that can mobilize collectively during a crisis. A vibrant civil society brings all groups together – formal civil society organizations, informal groups, social movements unions, religious groups, and business leaders –together, across class, ethnic, and religious divides, during times of crisis.
